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Tuesday, 19 January 2016

Travis, McDowell, and Whitehead

I'm beginning to engage more directly with the Travis-McDowell controversy on the content of perceptual experience and on having the world available in experience (Travis: "Unlocking the outside world", "The silence of the senses" and "Reasons reach", McDowell: "Avoiding the myth of the Given"). I'm doing that trying to look for broadly Whiteheadian elements to illuminate the debate. Travis makes use of Frege to somehow craft a direct realist position according to which the environment is open to one's view in perception. Through this account, it is possible to conceive of perception as an opening to the world and experience as a source of warrant that is completely different from what is justified (inferentially) through beliefs. McDowell responds to Travis position - more than to any particular argument he finds in his texts - with sympathy: he feels urged to move away from his Mind and World position according to which perceptual experience has propositional content and therefore has the same form as a belief. (His position, as he acknowledged, has prompted a reaction from Davidson and the Davidsonians along the lines of: well, then there's nothing special about experience, we can just describe it as sensory driven belief- acquisition.) McDowell now wants to give up this discursive character of the content of perceptual experience in favor of a non-propositional yet conceptual account of perceptual content. Travis is right, he holds, to make sure the world gives us warrant through experience as the environment opens up to us, it doesn't say anything, it just presents itself to us in perception. However, he is wrong to describe this opening process as something that doesn't involve conceptual capacities. This makes Travis fall in the myth of the Given. But his position affords being remedied from this if we take seriously the Kantian conception of intuitions (Anschauungen): having something in view. Intuitions are, according to this new position McDowell holds, exercises of conceptual capacities that provide a unity that is not the propositional unity but rather something that identifies sensibles, objects and articulations in an indexical way. This is the way McDowell found to avoid the Given while making sure that experience is an episode of something very different in content from a belief, an intuition, that is not propositional and not a ready-made discursive claim.

The idea that conceptual intuitions are the content of perceptual experience for rational animals (as McDowell puts it) makes room for a general speculative thought that in presentational immediacy in general things are brought to view but only through a matrix of importances. What is interesting is that the presence of importance spreads beyond presentational immediacy towards the other, more general, mode of perception described by Whitehead: efficient causation. Both modes require senses of importance and both have somehow the perceived reality present in the perceptual effect. In causation, what makes itself present depends on the (so called causal) capacities of what is effected; hence, the red billiard ball cannot perceive (i.e. be affected) by the internal matter or the color of the white ball but only by its weight. The billiard ball doesn't have the capacity to be affected by the color of an object, this has no importance for the billiard ball. Yet, it is through causation that a ball makes the other ball present. In other words, the account of perceptual experience through intuitions favored now by McDowell is not only an appropriate way to deal with presentational immediacy but also a way to deal with perception in general (even in the mode of efficient causation): what is perceived is brought to the perceiver's presence through no inference, the content of perceptual experience is not that of a belief (propositional content ready for discourse), it opens the rest of the world to the perceiver and provides some sort of warrant and it is driven by the perceiver's sense of importance (which, I maintain, is the general form of any conceptual capacity for what is at stake is a capacity to coordinate what is present with the rest of what is known). Additionally, the speculative framework on which Whitehead places perception enables McDowell to respond to his demand of less intellectualism: perception is driven by all sort of importance matrixes but it provides a non-inferential drive to a particular course of action.


Sunday, 17 January 2016

What has happened to Ethica Circea?


Few years back, in 2013, Simone Lima, Lorraine de Fátima, Denise Agustinho, Valesca Zanello and others were involved in concocting a collective book proposal on animal ethics inspired by Circe. Nothing, as far as I know, came out of it. What has happened? What should we rather do? Below is the proposal we wrote.



Ethica Circea
The transgressive virtues of transforming animals

The idea of this book arose from a group of researchers coming together to try and think of the ethical perspective of animals. The group composed by biologists, psychologists, philosophers and classical scholars felt that most recent work on animal ethics is done from a human perspective and no effort is done to consider what could possibly be the animal point of view. The overall consensus was that the endeavor to think about ethical issues concerning animals should start with considering features of their life and embodiment. And, in fact, such starting point should exorcize the many forms of appeal to gaps between human and animal life but rather begin with a grip on the commonalities of all forms of existence and, in particular, in the shared embodiment that sustain all those forms of life.

We took much inspiration from ancient discussions of human relations to animals – possibly because the distance of time provoked itself an estrangement with respect to the contemporary ways to think and conceive of human contact with animals. In particular, we were inspired by a dialogue by Plutarch1, were Circe, a sorcerer that appears at occasions in texts like the Odyssey, promotes a dialogue between Odisseus and a Greek turned into a pig who is led to explain why he prefer his current life from the point of view of virtues like courage, wisdom and temperance. Circe has the power to transform humans into other animals – and indeed turn them back to their previous form, if they would rather be humans. Circe holds an important key to understand things from an animal perspective: the key of experiencing life under another animal skin. She makes humans experience another body and another form of life while retaining some of their capacities, especially those that enable them to compare their previous experiences with their present state. Circe then appeared to us to be a central figure in our project: she stands for the possible passages between different forms of animal life.

Circe has connection with three important areas of our interest in animal life as a way to escape from human enclosed forms of life and thought. First, she evokes the possibility of becoming another animal. In doing that she transgresses the divide that Agamben2 diagnosed around what he called the anthropological machine that splits apart humans from other animals in a binary structures. Agamben argues that different ways of conceiving nature – including human nature – provided different implementations of a (civilizing) program of placing all animals in a pole that contrasts with the common pole where all humans are supposed to stand. This is the role of much of our discourse on animals that revolves around comparisons between the unworthy of humanity and the animal. Becoming animal, a micropolitical project much explored by Deleuze and Guattari3, is a way to spoil some cogs of those anthropological machines. Deleuze and Guattari understood the becoming animal as one among several bodily capacities that opens up routes to break away from the compulsory project of producing and reproducing humanity as it is. Becoming is to be distinguished from imitating as the latter doesn’t bring to the fore the body differences between, say, a human and the mouse she is becoming. Experiences of becoming animal provide glimpses of an (ethical) animal perspective. Deleuze and Guattari evoke sorcerers, shamans and witches to make clear that becoming animal is something that the Westernized world has systematically discredit or put aside. Circe could in this context be seen as a master of ceremony for experiences of becoming animal that would provide a view of ethical life from outside the seemingly compulsory human perspective.

Circe also has to do with humans actually turning animals. She prefigures different sorts of trans-species experiences where people are captured by a desire to actually undergo body transformations to turn into an animal. These are experiences, for example, of people who declare to feel like another animal trapped in a human body. They could be ready to change their body to some extend to conform to their felt identity or they could be satisfied with being treated as individuals of another species and no longer as humans. It is interesting to speculate about the attractions to become another animal – especially in the context of human supremacy that is part of much of human formal and informal education. In fact, these desires, combined with experiences of becoming animals, can be read as betrayals to the common projects of humanity where our offspring is inculcated with a human pride. It is also interesting to consider humans that prefer to spend time with other animals and other gradients of trans-specific behavior. In particular, the current research on mirror neurons – those responsible for attending to other individual’s gestures – could shed some light in the physiology of the attraction to the bodily actions of different species. It can be conjectured that in those cases humans have a mirror neuron circuitry that is more readily fired in the presence of individuals of another species.

Circe also evokes the power of biotechnology. The possibly positive promise of such endeavor is to blur the distinctions between different species as genetic materials of species that were uncombined for millennia are now being put in contact. Biotechnology has been often looked at in a negative way as corporate companies who have projects of monopoly have dominated it. It can be see, however, under more positive lights if it is seen as a tool for combining and mutating species that enable further experimentation and, ultimately, opens the door for un-humanizing humanity. In fact, it can be argued that nothing but a freer, more spread and open biotechnology can counter the evils of its corporate variety. Biotechnology is the sort of sorcery that Circe employs: she produces talking pigs that retain their memories of a previous life form and hence recombines ingredients of the pig and human life. Current biotechnology also paves the way for what has been called the end of the Darwinian interlude.4 The interlude was the period where life was transformed and reinvented mostly through vertical genetic recombination – through individuals reproduced within a species. That empire of the species can be coming to an end. The end of the species period heralds the end of the human species – both as an entity and as a project (for humans). To think beyond of the Darwinian interlude is to think of life as a horizontal plan of experimentation. Freer genetic recombination enables transitions of perspectives between different embodied creatures and therefore opens the possibility of a community of all animals and all life forms sharing common projects together.

The book will be composed by different chapters that will be jointly written by all members of the group. We have envisaged a methodology where one or two authors provide a first version and all the others add or remove something to make sure we make the best of our collaboration.

Ethica Circea will have the following chapters:

1. Animal ethics and the anthropological machine

One of the central challenges of an ethics from an animal perspective is to think beyond the many-faced divide between humans and animals. The divide makes humans somehow special – for their reasoning, their technological capacities, their existential pathologies, their virtues or their openness – and therefore differing from all forms of animal life at once. It is as if the animal is always beyond the pale; those that are the ultimate foreigners, the irreducible strangers that could be treated with charity but not as a component of a shared community. Animals are seen as primarily non-human. An ethics that looks beyond this border and tries to exorcize it has to be an attempt to attain a viewpoint that is not hostage to the varieties of anthropological machines. This chapter will introduce the problem and its possible solutions. It will engage with existing approaches to animal ethics and address some of their limitations. This will be a point of departure for a sketch of a different take where animals are no longer in the other side of a bipolar landscape.

2. Transgrecirce: Circe and the insights of animal life

Circe enables the animal – or rather the animal hybrid – to speak and plea for the ethical advantages of their current state. The purpose of the endeavor of the book could be understood as updating her gesture of bringing to the fore a voice coming from the animal. Circe appears for the first time in the texts in Homer, in the Odyssey (X) as a goddess capable to turn humans into pets and wild animals and revert them back to their human form and also to turn humans into immortal beings eternally young, something she proposes to Odysseus and he rejects. When Odysseus arrives with his men in Circe’s island, they are all turned into animals, except the hero who is protected from her spells by eating an immunity plant. Plutarch is the one who makes use of this passage to present a dialogue between Odysseys and one of his men turned into a pig – Gryllos – where the latter claims that animals live a more virtuous and commendable life than humans. Gryllos, clearly arguing in favor of the greater ethics of animal life, is not completely an animal but a trans-species being. Gryllos is an important inspiration for Etica Circea: he is a hybrid and as such he reflects on the transgressing ethics possibilities open up by his animal perspective Plutarch makes explicit the transgressive potential of Circe as her powers enable one to be rid of the compulsory allegiance to humanity. This chapter introduces the toolbox available for an ethics that is informed by insights of animal life and therefore by Circe’s pharmakon.

3. Glimpses of animality: becoming animal and ways to attain a non-human perspective

We often qualify as animal some of our behavior or capacities (often associated with fleeing, feeding our group, fighting or enjoying erotic resources). We also qualify as natural some of our actions – typically when we want to eschew responsibility. Simondon5 draws an interesting distinction between preservation tendencies in a community on the one hand and, on the other, instincts, which can flow between communities, between species and therefore travel across various forms of life. Action moved by those instincts are often seen as momentary lapses of humanity, moments where something goes against our supposedly shared human nature. Some of these moments can be seen as glimpses of animality, quick insights into animal embodiment and action. In particular, Circe can inspire us to view them as a insights into the virtues that guide animal life. As such, they are ethical technologies of possession that enable us to afford a perspective where the matrix of relevance and irrelevance shifts enough to perceive the virtues not laden with the plot of human supremacy. Becoming animal is an exercise of repeating the gestures, behaviors and attentions that are ruled out by such a supremacy. It is not just wanting-to-be-another-animal but rather an episode of contamination that can come from anywhere in our lives. The presence of a becoming-animal presents us with an animality not confined to animals and spreading in parts of human life. It is a window to a non-human perspective. This chapter will examine the import of becoming animal and its relevance for an experience that goes beyond human capacity to make ethical judgments.

4. Trapped in another species body

Trans-specism is a growing fashion (together with phenomena such as furry fandom). The possibility to transition to a different species is gradually open by technological means. This species nomadism is reminiscent of Circe’s sorcery and puts the whole issue of animal life in a different landscape. This chapter focuses on the condition that leads to a species dysphoria. It will also consider whether being trapped in another’s body (another species, another gender, another body plan) could be understood in terms of having mirror neurons incompatible with the respective action neurons. So, the mirror neurons would fire in the presence of something alien to one’s own species.
To break away with a species could then start with resistant mirror neurons that insist in repeating something outside the scope of the species. The anatomy and neurology of an individual is not subservient to the species it belongs, it contains, rather, elements that enable us to be contaminated by other species to the point of seeing ourselves as alien within our own. This feeling of alienation – dysphoria – is to be considered in its ethical import for it gathers the discontentment that breaks up with the existing patters of life. Species dysphoria, in all its degrees, provides us with the ethical knowledge of the discontent, of those that don’t want to have their lives guided by the customs and interest of their species. This chapter explores this ethical knowledge, the virtues of seeking exile from the human species.

5. Anarco-zoology: zoology in the times of biotechnology

Biotechnology brings up several ethical issues and a good number of them has to do with animals. The growing technological capacity to interfere in animal life – and in animal forms of life – is often solely taken to be no more than a resource for human hybris. In fact, biotechnology has been used to control animal life and to implement the human idea that the animals are others – or rather the unified Other as subjects of our domination. As such, humans have been breeding them, herding them, mixing their genetic materials at their leisure. Biotechnology has therefore been used to make animals subject to human control. It can, nevertheless, be seen also as
a tool to unsettle the human project and the integrity of humanity as a species. Once human gene pool is included in the biotechnological program, humans can find ways to betray their position as masters and mix with the animal world also to gain insight about their virtues. Biotechnology can therefore provide a Circean pharmakon. It is not only an instruments in the hands of the master, but something that can be revamped to become a tool against human supremacy, for it provides the means to experiment with different combinations of the bits and pieces that have been biologically and politically separated into the realm of the human and the domain of the animal. Biotechnology enables a view that goes beyond species and understands life in terms other that that of a species-based evolution. In fact, the prospect of an end of the Darwinian interlude insinuates that the view that implicitly recommends ethical attitudes tied to a species is importantly short-sighted.
In particular, it is interesting to look at archeas, forms of life that exchange genetic material horizontally in a way that contrasts with the species-based vertical way that is preponderant in these Darwinian times. This chapter will look at ethical virtues beyond the borders of species and at how the mix of species can be an ethical opportunity rather than a biotechnological catastrophe we can envisage at present.

6. Animal ethics from a non-specist perspective

The animal disrupts the human order and its associate intention to rule life in the planet. A Circean perspective is one where we stop extoling humans for their ethical capacities and start looking at how what we can learn from other animals. It is a commitment to attempt to see things with non-human animal eyes. As such, it engages in its toolbox elements such as species dysphoria, becoming-animal, biotechnology and, among all, an examination of animal life that considers the animal perspective – something akin to a symmetric ethology. In this respect, we can be inspired by the so-called multinaturalism of the human populations of the Low Amazon as studied by Viveiros de Castro and Tania Stolze.6 Multinaturalism considers that things are perspectival and therefore human world is no more than an example of a nature, and different animals have different perspectives that bring about different natures. Amazonian perspectivism conceives the different forms of animal life as being of the same status and make sure that there is no supremacy of one perspective over the others. It also includes shamanism as a way to transit between different animal perspectives.This chapter will consider the insights of animal life in contrast with the view taken by ecological approaches that understand humans as the ultimate guarantor of a hidden equilibrium in nature. It will discuss with current ecological ideas in order to consider them from a multinaturalist viewpoint and ultimately try to attempt a non-human perspective to guide ethical life.

7. The animal gaze

The last chapter will consider the import of being focused by animals as objects of view and recognition. Its starting point is both Stolze’s work on perspectivism7 and Derrida’s interesting reflections in L’animal que donc je suis.8 The animal gaze unsettles the human order in the sense that it indicates a different matrix of importance attached to things. The very fact that an animal looks around, and looks at humans, challenges the supremacy of human life based on human judgments that don’t hear any other side but their own. This chapter closes the book by reviewing the contribution of a phenomenology of being looked at to the contemporary Circean project. It also assembles the many elements put together through the book in order to integrate together the toolkit considered in the previous ones. We are now in the position to present an ethical outlook from an animal viewpoint – we have elements to grasp the ethical import of the animal gaze.

Friday, 15 January 2016

Grosz on freedom to and the nature of spontaneity

Elizabeth Grosz, in her "Feminism, Materialism, and Freedom"(in New Materialisms, ed. by Coole and Frost, 2010, Duke), draws on Bergson to explore the notion of freedom to, a predicate of acts that involves the capacity to move in an unconstrained way. She cites Bergson (on page 148) saying that the "absence of any tangible reason is the more striking the deeper our freedom goes". She understands freedom as something positive, akin to what Deleuze had in mind when he insisted on a connection between freedom and movement (see my previous post on freedom to). It interesting to compare Bergson's notion, under Grosz' lenses, with the analysis Leibniz offers in section 288 of the Theodicy. There he considers freedom to be composed of intelligence, contingency and spontaneity - but not of indifference. Indifference, Leibniz claims, has nothing to do with freedom, it is just nonsense to assume that there are real clinamina, swerves, in the world like the Epicurists have postulated. Plus, indifference is the exact opposite of freedom because there is no choice in absolute indifference. To be sure, he ties freedom with reasons to act and to individual intelligence which is itself tied to what an agent substantially is - as substances are nothing but bundles of past, present and future events. To act according to one's own motives is to act spontaneously and therefore not determined by somebody else's motives, including those of overarching necessities - this is where spontaneity connects with contingency. With Leibniz we could say that there is a measure of freedom everywhere, like what Grosz would like to say, especially if we consider freedom to to have to do with spontaneity and contingency (no matter intelligence and preventing indifference). Bergson then can be understood either as analyzing the nature of spontaneity by saying that to act according to one's own motives is to act by what goes beyond any tangible reason or as stressing again the key of indifference if the absence of any tangible reasons amounts to no reason at all.

Conversa com Niède Guidon na Serra da Capivara sobre Clovis etc

Depois de alguns dias na Serra da Capivara, um rápido encontro com a arqueóloga que descobriu tudo em sua casa em São Raimundo Nonato.
Começa aqui e segue aqui.


Thursday, 31 December 2015

Limbale's last-minute-sex-change novel

Just finished reading a 2003-4 novel by Sharankumar Limbale, called Hindu. It is a dalit novel and, being such, it is novel of collectives and is interestingly mostly about public space events. It is about how dalits are forced by multiple powers to accommodate within the Hindu (and often Hindutva) order even years after the Ambedkar's struggles and the help of some legislation and federal institutions. The plot starts with the murder of a dalit leader and ends with the judicial acquittal of the savarna's perpetrators. In the meantime there are two elections, a lynching of a dalit women by savarna villagers, some episodes of betrayal and loads of soul-searching of dalit groups mostly around the convenience and efficacy of converting out of hinduism. The novel revolves around Gopichand and Manikchand, two brothers who act like one and appear as a double - two but acting as one, savarnas close to Hindutva and at the same time hanging out with dalits and providing money for their campaign, electing dalits and making they play the establishment (or the Hindutva) game etc. They make money out of the savarna-avarna conflict - as they say, dalits have to revolt, there is no reason for them to stop the conflict. The conflict is, for the duo, the source of their living and, at the same time, what give them prestige. Also the story is narrated both in third person and my Milind Kamble who is part of the dalit movement but takes part of the night adventures of Gopichand and Manikchand that often involve raping and abusing dalit women. It is a portray of the dead end dalit situation involving most ingredients of their state of affairs: Hindutva, conversion, Ambedkar, avarna women, money and Indian election politics, the lot.

However, up to the very end there are no appearances of hijras (eunuchs, in the English translation). Hijras live like avarnas and are the worse of from the outcast community. In the very end of the book, Milind, the narrator, is inside a car with a woman, Gopichand and Manikchand as they meet the hijras who ask for money and kiss Gopichand's hands (or was Manikchand's?). Then Milind undergoes a sex change. As the narrator, he feels humiliated as his body becomes different piece by piece and comments that he lost his masculinity because he left the dalit movement - gradually seduced by Gopichand and Manikchand's way of life. Confronted with the sudden sex change, the brothers and Shaila Satpute, the woman in the car, laugh at Milind. Then comes the last phrase of the novel: "I held Manikchand's hand, kissing it loyally".

What is this about? Maybe it is about castes really, and women are sometimes portrayed in the book as almost an outcast even when they come from a savarna background. Maybe it is about the domineering role figures like the brothers have, they have money and power and that make them hypermales that feminize whatever touch them. In a desperate novel, though, it is a final touch of desperate misogyny: the sex change makes Milind even more subservient to the double powers that be.

Wednesday, 30 December 2015

First pages of the book on animism I'm concocting

The working title of the book is Linhas de Animismo Futuro, (Lines of future animism). What follows is
just the preliminary opening paragraphs, as they are now:

Não um espectro, mas um ancião cheio de plásticas ronda a Europa conceptual – esta que se espalha por uma geometria variável e que se encontra tanto nas academias quanto nos parlamentos, nas repartições de governo, nas corporações. Nem sequer um único ancião, mas muitos: os animismos. Eles são antigos e parecem fantasmagórico, mas parecem também biônicos, cibernéticos e protéticos. Espectros ciborgues talvez. Múltiplos, com muitas caras, muitas cabeças e muitas caudas. São os ecos daquilo que anima os outros: a atmosfera da terra, as populações animais, os insetos transmissores, a microbiota receptora, os equilíbrios ecológicos, o alcance das marés, o objeto qualquer. O não-humano, o natural, o que não passa de um objeto, enfim tudo aquilo que esteve por séculos posto a parte como não mais que um cenário ou uma paisagem de fundo para a aventura humana que é em si inocente de qualquer animação própria, epur si muove.

Os espectros ciborgues plurais são portanto a multidão dos animismos que se regeneram e que se tornam outra vez disponíveis para a convicção e para a persuasão. Pensar de uma maneira animista coordena de modo diverso toda relação que os humanos mantêm com o resto do mundo já que os animismos são uma instância de propagação de protagonismos. Ao invés de nos fazer perguntar acerca de como nós lidamos com o resto do mundo ou como podemos alcançar o resto do mundo – ou se há um resto do mundo para além de nós – eles nos fazem perguntar, sem sequer pressupor que nós e o resto do mundo são times bem definidos, como tudo o que há se alcança e lida com todos os demais. Ao invés de pressupor quais atores podem assumir o papel de sujeito – só alguns – e quais o papel de objeto, eles propõe uma outra trama ou, quando esta trama consolidada e estabelecida parece inevitável, entendem que todos os atores são onnagata – aqueles atores homens que fazem o papel de mulheres no teatro Kabuki japonês – de acordo com as necessidades dos personagens. Ao invés de considerar o animado – aquele que se move de motu proprio, que se regula, que se comanda e que é capaz de começar alguma coisa – como sendo de alguma forma dissociada da fisicalidade, os animismos o encontram por toda parte. A animação não é mais a exceção humana. Nem sequer talvez o produto de uma combinação bem-feita de elementos originalmente inanimados. A animação é apresentada como endêmica.

É certo que qualquer espectro ancião, ciborgue e múltiplo do animismo está em choque com muitas convicções correntes. Ele contrasta por exemplo com a ideia de que há no fundo da natureza leis ou regularidades inevitáveis, com a ideia de que é o protagonismo que precisa ser explicado e não simplesmente assumido e com a ideia de que fora do âmbito humano há talvez reagentes, mas nunca agentes. Este livro pretende esboçar um mapeamento de alguns movimentos em direção a uns animismos nas últimas décadas e também consolidar a tese de que eles formam genuínas plataformas políticas, ainda que de uma política reinventada, deslocada, despercebida e que atenda a exigências bastante outras. Trata-se de um exercício de trazer à baila ingredientes para futuras construções animistas. Ingredientes divergentes; e o livro não se preocupa em fazê-los convergir, apenas em tentar encontrar maneiras de servi-los.

A dinâmica de expansão da animação associado às políticas animistas formam uma figura de perspectiva. O nós em que nos reconhecemos se compõe de maneiras variadas e seu alcance é ele mesma deítico - nós, como eu, ou como aqui e agora, mais dificilmente descritos do que apontados, tacitamente pressupostos antes de explicitamente definidos. O protagonismo não esteve sempre destinado a todos os mesmos humanos – a engrenagem que reparte protagonistas de coadjuvantes foi instalada em diferentes lugares. É uma engrenagem que traça fronteiras – deixando um nós dentro e o resto do lado de fora. Aqueles como nós, os que traçam a fronteira, são os que exercem agência, inclusive para estabelecer, manter e guardar a fronteira. O que está do lado de dentro protagoniza também a distinção, já que é o que está dentro que pensa ou que determina ou que promove começos (e exerce comandos). O que está do lado de dentro é soberano; e soberano para estabelecer aquilo que tem soberania e é arché – arquetípico e primordial, governante e mandatário, comando e começo. A engrenagem que faz esta distinção precisa ser mantida junto com ela, a distinção entre nós os genuinamente dotados de animação e os demais é como uma diferença fundadora que não pode ser perdida de vista, que não pode ser dada como indiferente, que traça uma fronteira que não pode abdicar de check points. Giorgio Agamben (Il aperto) introduz a ideia de máquinas antropológicas como engrenagens a serviço de alguma distinção entre o humano e o não-humano (e também, o sub-humano). As máquinas antropológicas tem que estar em funcionamento para que o humano se reconheça como sui generis, mas diferentes máquinas – ou seja, diferentes distinções e engrenagens – foram colocadas em funcionamento. As máquinas antropológicas, Agamben mostra, têm uma arqueologia.

Peter Sloterdijk (Spheren) entende estes nós cambiantes em que nos reconhecemos em termos de esferas ou bolhas que se dilatam em um movimento centrífugo em que âmbitos menores dão lugar a maiores. Pensando nos termos de uma história destas bolhas, a atribuição de animação não começa com uma visão de terceira pessoa, mas com um nós que é formado apenas pelos chamados humanos direitos – mais ou menos os homens, brancos, proprietários, adultos, não-descapacitados, hetero e cissexuais. Trata-se do sujeito como ele é concebido ainda hoje nos interstícios não-comentados dos modos usuais de viver na modernidade. Quando uma esfera assim é colocada em questão a partir da afirmação de que há protagonismo alhures – alhures há dor ou capacidade política ou direito ou reivindicação – um primeiro gesto de uma política animista foi ensaiado. Outros gestos similares conduzem à dilatação sucessiva das esferas. É certo que o gesto é inteiramente explicitado como animista apenas quando se estende a esfera para além das fronteiras do humano. Porém vale notar logo que o gesto se contrasta com aquele outro que afirma que é do interesse da esfera existente dar importância ao que está fora dela – é do interesse da esfera de homens brancos dar importância aos índios e negros ou é do interesse da esfera dos humanos dar importância à diversidade biológica que está do lado de fora. O primeiro gesto, aquele que inaugura um movimento político animista, dilata a esfera enquanto o segundo apenas a conserva. A pergunta que surge quase imediatamente com a menção de uma dinâmica política animista posta nestes termos é: até onde pode se substituir uma esfera por outra mais ampla em raio e que a contenha?

Nestes termos, a dinâmica política animista nos leva à questão do limite do nós, do limite de um âmbito em que nos reconhecemos. Se não há limite, a animação é generalizada e universal e a agência está distribuída por toda parte. Uma alternativa assim convida a uma bolha de tamanho cósmico, a um nós que abrange tudo o que há. Com isso surge uma cosmopolítica – o termo de Isabelle Stengers para considerar em que medida, como Bruno Latour uma vez vaticinou, a ciência é a continuação da política por outros meios –, uma economia geral – o termo que Georges Bataille usa para contrastar a agência econômica que não está disposta em termos da auto-sobrevivência à um economia restrita que é comumente considerada como a economia1 da escassez humana – e também a possibilidade de uma constituição dos direitos de tudo. Ao longo do livro os direitos não-humanos, de cosmopolíticas e de economia geral reaparecem; cada um deles insinua que quando expandido para além das fronteiras variáveis do humano, as instituições familiares se transformam para além de qualquer reconhecimento – elas se tornam gradativamente não mais mais do mesmo, mas algo de estranho, de unheimlich e de irreconhecível. Surge, prontamente, a questão de se elas podem ser estranhas o suficiente, unheimlich como devem ser e genuinamente irreconhecíveis2 já que falar de política, de economia e de direito é estar em um solo demasiadamente humano.

A expansão da bolha promovida pelos animismos deixa exposta a questão: onde e por que fazer parar a dilatação do nós? Ou seja, como fazemos e porque precisamos fazer uma distinção em termos de protagonismo entre nós e todo o resto? Se há uma genuína fronteira, em que termos ela se institui e de que maneira ela se mantêm? A questão exposta assim é ela mesma um explosivo político pois o expansionismo do nós ecoa já como um projeto colonial de usurpar o território (do inanimado) que nos é alheio – e, ainda assim, ele é alheio a quem? A questão exposta deixa claro que as bolhas dilatantes tem não apenas uma arqueologia e uma história, mas também uma perspectiva: nós, os animados – somos animados porque somos nós ou somos nós porque nos reconhecemos como animados? Talvez a animação não seja ela mesma mais do que uma perspectiva: animados somos nós e assim como os outros se reconhecem também como um nós, eles também se reconhecem como animados diante da inanimação de todo o resto. Ou haveria uma maneira de atravessar esta fricção de perspectivas e de genuinamente alcançar uma animação que não seja irremediavelmente nossa, uma animação dos outros?




Saturday, 26 December 2015

Worlds and monads

The last sections of part 3 of Leibniz's Theodicy makes clear that interaction were part of what happened between the monads in the simulation process that takes place in the Palace of Destinies that Palas Athena guards. In fact, God had to consider all possible worlds in order to choose the right combination. Monads could be taken as building blocks that are agents or reagents. They have all their history encapsulated in themselves and therefore they are repositories of events. In Leibniz, there is an infinite number of them (and not an indefinite number). It is enough for God to choose a collection of monads in order to choose a world. God would consider the different classes of monads. Every contingent alternative was considered in the Palace: sinning Adam with the serpent and non-sinning counter-Adam with the iguana. God considered every counterpart of Adam and therefore the interactions between Adam and the rest of the world were played in the Palace before God. What is missing in Leibniz's monadology is the sense of present time: present time interaction among monads is dispensable (the interaction that matters happens in the Palace), present time decision-making is no more than a shadow of what took place in the Palace and present time hesitation is no more than lack of knowledge. In the simulation process, on the other hand, interaction is present between each monad, their counterparts and the rest of the world.

However, because Leibniz (and, I argue, every monadology) is contingentist, there is no room for trans-world monads. Monads are not like
the alphabet in which worlds could be written. Leibniz has that God chose monads and not aggregates of monads. Plus, worlds cannot be understood in terms of different elements in the set of parts of all monads for monads are never trans-worldly. If one conceive worlds as composed of building blocks of an alphabet, we can consider all worlds in this alphabet as elements of the set of parts of the building blocks. Such a class would be the class of all worlds, possible or impossible - that is, they would form a superset of the class of all possible worlds. In our current work on galaxy theory (exploration of the relation between different logics by considering the different classes of possible worlds - galaxies - associated to each of them) we are considering the relation of access between words of different galaxies. Each galaxy is a subset of the set of parts above. But each logic could be build as a relation from a given galaxy to any other. Monadologies are beginning to look like no more than a small portion of a far ampler space of worlds and relations between them.