"Les formules sélon lesquelles "la chose nie ce qu'elle n'est pas" ou "se distingue de tout ce qu'elle n'est pas" sont de monstres logiques (le Tout de ce que n'est pas la chose) au service de l'identité." Deleuze, DR, 70.
Aharon Link suggests that we shall take reflections about capture instead of clausure, heterochrony, accelerationism, drift repetition and entrainement to be heading towards a rhythm-oriented ontology. If we take rhythm to underlie being and nothingness, we consider that irreversible time underlies the discussion about origins, wholes and emptiness. Silence, if complete, is a rhythm. The extensive continuum is a rhythm. The apeiron and Anaxagoras' assembled whole are rhythms. Also, mereological considerations would have to be rethought in terms of rhythm. For instance, maybe it will make no sense to make assumptions (that are at the service of identity, as Deleuze reminds us) concerning a whole such that we can consider the difference between such a whole and any thing. Any collection of rhythms is partial because rhythm tends to be junky - every rhythm is a part. There is no nothingness as an origin, no whole as an origin. Priority monism is then maybe discarded. Plus, rhythms are incorrigibly indexical: they enjoy nothing like a priority of the world expressed over the expressing monads that Leibniz seems to hold (contra Whitehead). Such priority is a form of monism in Leibniz.
Rhythms could be the ultimate way to vindicate Heraclitus remarks on what is still and what moves and his claim (DK B30) that the world is made of measures - and not a creation.
Aharon Link suggests that we shall take reflections about capture instead of clausure, heterochrony, accelerationism, drift repetition and entrainement to be heading towards a rhythm-oriented ontology. If we take rhythm to underlie being and nothingness, we consider that irreversible time underlies the discussion about origins, wholes and emptiness. Silence, if complete, is a rhythm. The extensive continuum is a rhythm. The apeiron and Anaxagoras' assembled whole are rhythms. Also, mereological considerations would have to be rethought in terms of rhythm. For instance, maybe it will make no sense to make assumptions (that are at the service of identity, as Deleuze reminds us) concerning a whole such that we can consider the difference between such a whole and any thing. Any collection of rhythms is partial because rhythm tends to be junky - every rhythm is a part. There is no nothingness as an origin, no whole as an origin. Priority monism is then maybe discarded. Plus, rhythms are incorrigibly indexical: they enjoy nothing like a priority of the world expressed over the expressing monads that Leibniz seems to hold (contra Whitehead). Such priority is a form of monism in Leibniz.
Rhythms could be the ultimate way to vindicate Heraclitus remarks on what is still and what moves and his claim (DK B30) that the world is made of measures - and not a creation.
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