No Borders Metaphysics

My own notion of cosmopolitics is slightly different from that Stengers has been proposing and examining. I tend to add to her notion, grounded on the idea of an ecology of practices, two other elements that, it seems to me, make the notion more dramatic and still more crucial. I take the ecology of practices is about the conflicts, indifference, collaborations and alliances between practices of knowing, intervening and keeping company. The ecology of practices is the very cosmic scenario where any epistemic endeavor takes place - but also what the epistemic endeavor sponsors (and maintains, instaurates, brings about) in its surroundings. To the ecology of practices, I would add the history of being in the sense of Heidegger: what makes nihilism a cosmopolitics is that it names an attitude of intelligence extraction towards the rest of the cosmos - including the very protagonists of intelligence-extraction. The history of nihilism and of whatever precedes and succeeds it is cosmopoliti

O artigo da primeira apresentação da infância das máquinas foi publicado na revista Direitos, Trabalho e Política Social .

Can thought be non-Fregean? Can we therefore think genuinely de re ? Frege in ´"The Thought", cited in footnote 52 of Kaplan´s "Demonstratives": "Only a sentence supplemented by a time-indication and complete in every respect expresses a thought". The idea behind what I called deferralism yesterday in the previous post is that Kaplan´s treatment of indexical is still hostage to the idea that genuine thought ought to be complete and fully resolved - even if indexical sentences depend on the world to complete the job of specifying a content, a thought. Kaplan seems to believe that the thought as such - the proposition - needs to be identified and individuated in a de dicto manner. Thought is therefore never itself situated. It seems to me that a metaphysical indexicalism needs to reject this Fregean conception of thought endorsed by Kaplan - no matter whether the way to go is deferralist (but I think this is a promising approach).

Thinking about how to present and argue for indexicalism - a metaphysical thesis that the world is indexical - in terms closer to those of Kaplan, Perry and Wettstein. Been going through Kaplan´s Demonstratives . My initial ideas boil down a lot to the distinction between character and content. Kaplan understands character as the rule governing the indexical term while content is what, in a context, the indexical term point to. Direct reference, for Kaplan, is a result of content being composed by individuals, by objects - propositions have individuals as their components. The de re character of the proposition (and the direct reference associated to an expression with a content) is given by the presence in the content of individuals that can be described in substantive terms - so in his example "He now lives in Princeton, New Jersey", if he is not Paul but Charles, the content of the sentence is different (he calls the respective propositions Pat and Mike). Pat and Mike are

I'm signing a contract with the Edinburgh University Press to publish the book I called Deictic Absolutes in the Speculative Realism series. They want to change the title of the book and name it Indexicalism: The Metaphysics of Paradox . I'm not yet fully sure. I copy here the table of contents: Table of Contents Introduction: Reality and speculation Speculative realism and the Great Outdoors Totality and speculation Other dialogues The paradox of deictic speculation 1. Indexicalism: a paradoxico-metaphysics Indexicalism Paradoxico-metaphysics The routes to indexicalism (and paradox) Situated metaphysics Monadologies Totality Demonstratives and proper names Tense realism and baroque realism Horizon Measurement Exteriority and externalism Proximity Object-oriented Tentacular thinking 2. The metaphysics of the others The others The φύσις of the others Perspectivism The metaphysics of the others at the age of the correlate Meillassoux After specul