Skip to main content

The vocabulary of agency in epistemology

Davidson's insistence in the complementary powers of the world and one's community; one cannot be under the power of the world without being simultaneously under the power of one's community - knowing it and knowing its norms. It is as if two simultaneous agencements are to take place, two simultaneous sovereign powers that cannot be effective without each other. The fine structure of correlation spelt out by Davidson shows how one cannot be simply under the command of the world - spontaneity of one's community gets on the way. The discussion concerning the Given is therefore about powers - how to be under the command of the world through our senses as opposed to be under the spontaneous command of our own senses that introduce, say, a conceptual modulation that interfere in the orders we get from the world. The vocabulary of spontaneity and command (of arché) is really inconspicuous but present in epistemology: it is always about looking for an authority and making sure first that it is cogent and second that it genuinely commands one's beliefs.

Then, if we consider the central issue of epistemic luck, some lights can be shed. Think of the Kantian distinction between acting in accordance with moral duty and acting from moral duty. In the latter but not in the former, one is under the command and power of moral duty. In cases of epistemic luck, one is not in the command and power of truth that could be present but only in the sense of us being in accordance with it (and not in the sense of us believing from it). Truth could be present but not in command of my beliefs. I fail to genuinely know when I don't genuinely obey truth. My beliefs, in this case, are not from truth, but only in accordance to it. There is no authority of truth exercising its power over my thought but just truth being present in my thoughts by (epistemic) luck. What is at stake when one claims knowledge differs from true opinion is about command, about the danger of only being in accordance with the command of the authority of truth, as opposed to thinking from it - which is feeling the power of its authority.


Comments

Post a Comment

Popular posts from this blog

Hunky, Gunky and Junky - all Funky Metaphysics

Been reading Bohn's recent papers on the possibility of junky worlds (and therefore of hunky worlds as hunky worlds are those that are gunky and junky - quite funky, as I said in the other post). He cites Whitehead (process philosophy tends to go hunky) but also Leibniz in his company - he wouldn't take up gunk as he believed in monads but would accept junky worlds (where everything that exists is a part of something). Bohn quotes Leibniz in On Nature Itself «For, although there are atoms of substance, namely monads, which lack parts, there are no atoms of bulk, that is, atoms of the least possible extension, nor are there any ultimate elements, since a continuum cannot be composed out of points. In just the same way, there is nothing greatest in bulk nor infinite in extension, even if there is always something bigger than anything else, though there is a being greatest in the intensity of its perfection, that is, a being infinite in power.» And New Essays: ... for there is nev
1 comment
Read more

Talk on ultrametaphysics

 This is the text of my seminar on ultrametaphysics on Friday here in Albuquerque. An attempt at a history of ultrametaphysics in five chapters Hilan Bensusan I begin with some of the words in the title. First, ‘ultrametaphysics’, then ‘history’ and ‘chapters’. ‘Ultrametaphysics’, which I discovered that in my mouth could sound like ‘ autre metaphysics’, intends to address what comes after metaphysics assuming that metaphysics is an endeavor – or an epoch, or a project, or an activity – that reaches an end, perhaps because it is consolidated, perhaps because it has reached its own limits, perhaps because it is accomplished, perhaps because it is misconceived. In this sense, other names could apply, first of all, ‘meta-metaphysics’ – that alludes to metaphysics coming after physics, the books of Aristotle that came after Physics , or the task that follows the attention to φύσις, or still what can be reached only if the nature of things is considered. ‘Meta-m
Post a Comment
Read more

Memory assemblages

My talk here at Burque last winter I want to start by thanking you all and acknowledging the department of philosophy, the University of New Mexico and this land, as a visitor coming from the south of the border and from the land of many Macroje peoples who themselves live in a way that is constantly informed by memory, immortality and their ancestors, I strive to learn more about the Tiwas, the Sandia peoples and other indigenous communities of the area. I keep finding myself trying to find their marks around – and they seem quite well hidden. For reasons to do with this very talk, I welcome the gesture of directing our thoughts to the land where we are; both as an indication of our situated character and as an archive of the past which carries a proliferation of promises for the future. In this talk, I will try to elaborate and recommend the idea of memory assemblage, a central notion in my current project around specters and addition. I begin by saying that I
Post a Comment
Read more