Skip to main content

Trías insights about a language for metaphysics

I ended up in this improbable adventure of translating Heidegger's Die Gefahr into Portuguese. First because I was interested in what is there said about the Lager and about death in general and then because I'm taken by the power of this text and of all of the Einblick lectures. Translating it is very difficult - the first sentence is already a big problem: Das Ge-stell beslellt den Bestand, and different translations render it very differently. We consider doing more than one parallel translation (what the de Campos brothers called a tridução, for three translations). While doing this I was involved with reading Emmanuel Faye's well-researched and somehow claustrophobic "Heidegger et l'introduction du nazisme en philosophie" together with a book by Eugenio Trías, La Dispersión. Both turned out to be good companions to my immersion in Heidegger's Einblick.

Faye holds that Heidegger created an ontological negationism in his Bremen lectures, especially in Die Gefahr. His book is full of important information about how Heidegger navigated between the Nazi establishment and his philosophical convictions. It ends up claiming that Heidegger is no genuine philosopher, which is always disappointing and hard to justify (and claustrophobic). Trías has two aphorisms that point towards a method and a vocabulary in metaphysics (chapter El hilo del discurso at page 80 of my edition Madrid: Taurus, 1971). He says, in my translation: "Good metaphysics present their claims with the most ambiguous signs of a language, those are versatile and polymorphous [...] because these signs can cross different universes of discourse and stay afloat". "The polysemy of language", he continues in the following aphorism, "is the fuel of thought". In the next page he goes: "The crisis of metaphysics [...] is a crisis of expressive resources".

Comments

Popular posts from this blog

Hunky, Gunky and Junky - all Funky Metaphysics

Been reading Bohn's recent papers on the possibility of junky worlds (and therefore of hunky worlds as hunky worlds are those that are gunky and junky - quite funky, as I said in the other post). He cites Whitehead (process philosophy tends to go hunky) but also Leibniz in his company - he wouldn't take up gunk as he believed in monads but would accept junky worlds (where everything that exists is a part of something). Bohn quotes Leibniz in On Nature Itself «For, although there are atoms of substance, namely monads, which lack parts, there are no atoms of bulk, that is, atoms of the least possible extension, nor are there any ultimate elements, since a continuum cannot be composed out of points. In just the same way, there is nothing greatest in bulk nor infinite in extension, even if there is always something bigger than anything else, though there is a being greatest in the intensity of its perfection, that is, a being infinite in power.» And New Essays: ... for there is nev

Talk on ultrametaphysics

 This is the text of my seminar on ultrametaphysics on Friday here in Albuquerque. An attempt at a history of ultrametaphysics in five chapters Hilan Bensusan I begin with some of the words in the title. First, ‘ultrametaphysics’, then ‘history’ and ‘chapters’. ‘Ultrametaphysics’, which I discovered that in my mouth could sound like ‘ autre metaphysics’, intends to address what comes after metaphysics assuming that metaphysics is an endeavor – or an epoch, or a project, or an activity – that reaches an end, perhaps because it is consolidated, perhaps because it has reached its own limits, perhaps because it is accomplished, perhaps because it is misconceived. In this sense, other names could apply, first of all, ‘meta-metaphysics’ – that alludes to metaphysics coming after physics, the books of Aristotle that came after Physics , or the task that follows the attention to φύσις, or still what can be reached only if the nature of things is considered. ‘Meta-m

Memory assemblages

My talk here at Burque last winter I want to start by thanking you all and acknowledging the department of philosophy, the University of New Mexico and this land, as a visitor coming from the south of the border and from the land of many Macroje peoples who themselves live in a way that is constantly informed by memory, immortality and their ancestors, I strive to learn more about the Tiwas, the Sandia peoples and other indigenous communities of the area. I keep finding myself trying to find their marks around – and they seem quite well hidden. For reasons to do with this very talk, I welcome the gesture of directing our thoughts to the land where we are; both as an indication of our situated character and as an archive of the past which carries a proliferation of promises for the future. In this talk, I will try to elaborate and recommend the idea of memory assemblage, a central notion in my current project around specters and addition. I begin by saying that I