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Artificial transcendental subject - or is transcendental philosophy artificial intelligence?

Under the spell of Nick Land old and new (first texts on Kant from the late 80s where Kant appears in line with colonialism in making us immune from the other and recent interview with Justin Murphy where he compares the critique of metaphysics to the endeavor of capital, both infectious, both non-ending) I started my course on contemporary philosophy talking about Kant and the correlationisms of the late 20th century. I then found myself drifting towards a post-anthroplogical, cybernetic Kant who describes a transcedental structure as a normative structure that has to be in place for experience (empirical judgments) to be possible. This transcedental structure is not an anthropology and therefore it is not quite that he never woke up from an anthropological slumber. His description of the transcendental subject is a kind of reverse engeneering of empirical judgments - almost as if he´s trying to pass a transcendental Turing test for the capacity to have experience. As such, it is also a set of specifications to be satified by a genuine subject (of experience). In fact, as we create empirical subjects as reliable reporters of what goes on in experience, we engage in the effort of inculcating in the human infants the capacity to make emprirical judgments. We do help buiding subjects everywhere. But they don´t need to be biological human. The cyborg, created in our image and likeness, is also created in the image and likeness of the transcedental subject. The us which are the norms that allow empirical judgment to take place are human but only in a restricted sense that a cyborg can emulate (there is no transcendental body as there are nor transcendental inclinations for Kant). The transcendental description of the subject of experience is precisely an effort to determine what makes the mind (the organ of empirical knowledge) what it is. A cybernetic endeavor and as some still prevalent (GOFAI-like) efforts in AI, one that assumes the body carries no transcendental weight - and therefore nothing in it needs emulating.

Surely, in a similar way, Capital is a flow that circulates not only between humans, but more and more through cyborgs. It is, in fact, a drive towards a becoming-artificial (deterritorialized).

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