The economy of reciprocity requires, in Derrida's Circumfession, that he offers ingratitude to Bennington so that Bennington can take him as the Other that will offer no reciprocity. Ingratitude - as much as sanctity, or other forms of positive cybernetics - is part of the Maussian circle. Derrida, I think, is juggling to escape from that circle while realizing it eats everything up. Sanctity, to be sure, do exist in its own right - but has to enforce ingratitude (Levinas says this explicitly in "The Trace of the Other", p. 349). Derrida deconstructs (and trusts) this idea by asking how ingratitude is forged. The absolute Other is not alien to the economy of reciprocity because sanctity comes about in a background of reciprocity (gratitude, ingratitude, the law of hospitality, hostility). In my discussion with Ahanon and Janina today we talked about offspring - parenting is a handy example for Levinas struggle to establish the possibility of sanctity. Offspring are enforced places for sanctity, because they are constituted in a way that they don't have the powers to be grateful - and this is not about kids but about offspring. Levinas holds that the (metaphysical) desire for the Other is the ground of our sociability, but the Maussian circle is defined as total social fact.
I´ve been wondering about whether we can formulate something about contingency along the lines of a principle of irreduction: aucune chose n´est par elle-même contingent ou necessaire . The principle asserts that necessity is always contingent on underlying fixed things: something is physically necessary (or contingent) given the fixed laws of nature, something is deontically contingent - allowed - or necessary - mandatory - given the fixed ethical rules (or laws of the land). Finally, something is logically necessary (or necessary simpliciter) given a fixed logic. The irreducible diversity of ethical rules, the absence of eternal laws of nature and the plurality of logical systems, if accepted, makes necessity relative to those parameters. An aggiornamento of Heraclitus would have that nothing is necessary comes what may. Surely, of couse, if there is no absolute necessity, there is no absolute contingency. We can then say that in a broader, more abstract level, things are up for grab...
Comments
Post a Comment