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Indexicalism as post-bifurcation thinking

I've been thinking, mostly due to my classes on Whitehead, that the rejection of bifurcation is a crucial component of my indexicalism (see the Open Philosophy recent paper). In a nutshell, indexicalism is the thesis that reality is fundamentally indexical and exteriority as the Great Outdoors cannot be exorcised from the picture. More than trying to respond to the idea that indexicalism is a metaphysics of subjectivity in Meillassoux's terms - it is not, because it endorses the version of the ontological argument that Levinas formulated: by conceiving its exteriority, a subjectivity ensures its existence - it should actually be placed in the Whiteheadian context that by exorcising bifurcation avoids the path towards the age of the correlate altogether. Through this exorcism, there is no longer room for a realm of experience which can be fully mistaken about how things are and provide no absolutes because it is correlational. If we have a firm grip on the idea that experience is all that there is to reality - together with the realist idea that reality is more than one's own experience - one can perhaps feel not tempted by the correlationist conundrums.

I guess indexicalism has to be placed in this post-bifurcation context and endorse the idea that indexicals (and the others, and exteriority) is to be thought within experience. To be sure, indexicalism brings to the picture a transcendence that is missing in the field of experience portrayed by Whitehead - with Levinas, indexicalism brings in the transcendence of the other and a thorough rejection of totality, which includes a rejection of the totality of experience. It draws from Jean Wahl's lesson that exteriority is part of what reality is - and of what we experience. Experience is therefore intrinsically incomplete and dealing within supplements. It pictures a different image of experience, not as what is completed by other experienced, but rather as a realm of interruptions where the experience of the others loom about without ever being fully present.

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