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Thursday, 27 June 2019

Harman and Garcia

Chatting today with Jadson, one of my PhD students, on object-oriented ontology, I said:
<< Maybe this is a coarse but enlghening way to approach the difference between Harman´s and Gacia´s account: just like Plato thought the distinction between the sensible and the intelligible is that both are extensionally separated, i.e. two different items, and Aristotle made this extensional separation into an intensional distinction, i.e. the same item can be both as sensible and as intelligible; Harman separates the real object from the sensual object as extensionally distinct while Garcia understands thing, which is independent of any other object, and object, among others, as two intensionally distinct modes of being of the same item - of the same object. >>

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