Can thought be non-Fregean? Can we therefore think genuinely de re?
Frege in ´"The Thought", cited in footnote 52 of Kaplan´s "Demonstratives": "Only a sentence supplemented by a time-indication and complete in every respect expresses a thought". The idea behind what I called deferralism yesterday in the previous post is that Kaplan´s treatment of indexical is still hostage to the idea that genuine thought ought to be complete and fully resolved - even if indexical sentences depend on the world to complete the job of specifying a content, a thought. Kaplan seems to believe that the thought as such - the proposition - needs to be identified and individuated in a de dicto manner. Thought is therefore never itself situated.
It seems to me that a metaphysical indexicalism needs to reject this Fregean conception of thought endorsed by Kaplan - no matter whether the way to go is deferralist (but I think this is a promising approach).
Frege in ´"The Thought", cited in footnote 52 of Kaplan´s "Demonstratives": "Only a sentence supplemented by a time-indication and complete in every respect expresses a thought". The idea behind what I called deferralism yesterday in the previous post is that Kaplan´s treatment of indexical is still hostage to the idea that genuine thought ought to be complete and fully resolved - even if indexical sentences depend on the world to complete the job of specifying a content, a thought. Kaplan seems to believe that the thought as such - the proposition - needs to be identified and individuated in a de dicto manner. Thought is therefore never itself situated.
It seems to me that a metaphysical indexicalism needs to reject this Fregean conception of thought endorsed by Kaplan - no matter whether the way to go is deferralist (but I think this is a promising approach).
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