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Presence and ingratitude: the (restrict) economy of Beyng

Today I started a course on Heidegger's History of Beyng (and on his Meditation). Reflecting on the precedence of Beying over being and beings (and the very ontological difference) while having in mind the contrast between presencing and Ereignis in Time and Being, I explored the idea of the metaphysics of presence in terms of the present, of the es gibt, of the gift. The economy of the gift is the circle of gratitude: in order to show that I'm thankful to the giver, I keep the gift, preserve it and make sure it is no annihilated. My endeavor (the metaphysical or onto-theological endeavor) is to make sure a durable form of the gift is always available, at my disposal. This economic status - a certain restricted economy of being and beings, of what presents itself through beings - presides over the era of persecution (or preservation), of representation, of thesis (as opposed to physis) and maybe of machination. This era is inagurated by a dispensation of being (of Beying), an economic order based on presents and gratitude that places whatever is in the reciprocity circle. In contrast, Heidegger talks about the event (Ereignis) as an appropriation. If appropriation is where being lies - and not the other way round - then there is a taking over of the inhabited world by the events of Beying. The economy that is foreseen then - or found in the past - is one of ingratitude. The ingratitude forged by appropriation, or expropriation. Beying is out of a reciprocal, symmetric relation because it is not grateful but acts with appropriation.

The event of appropriation is what constitutes the history of Beyng. The event of making sure gratitude is brought about is one of the moments in this history. It involves the debt that engages us in a quest for re-presentation (archiving, preserving, restoring) against a background of nothingness. Bataille would have that the avoidance of death (and degradation) is itself an economic gesture.

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