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The indexicality of conceptual thinking

I'm getting closer to a more solid connection between what a post-nihilist thinking can do and what indexicalism provides. While substantives could have an intelligibility that can be extracted, captured, followed or persecuted - with different degrees of success, with different degrees of approximation - because their correction is given by something independent of any situation, indexicals can only be understood in a context. A situated metaphysics is one where the effort of intelligence is a production that is not consummated in a product, in an idea or a thesis that is general and could expose and replace its object - situated thought is not about replacing what is thought but attempts to produce what is not geared towards a further distribution or registration.

At the same time, I understand how the indexicality of conceptual thinking is an example and not an exception to how things are. Indexicalism conceives concepts as being inextricably connected to the position from where they are thought. One can attempt to exorcise this tacit subjectivism of the "for us" of our conceptual capacities - this is the project Hegel inaugurated in order to render the lessons of Kant less subjectivists (and therefore more substantivist). The attempt to extricate concepts from indexicals is based on a conceptual dynamics that could be contemplated from nowhere and from no position in particular. However, this is only possible if concepts converge - if conceptual activity is understood as producing (fully present) products. The adventure started with Kant was that of concocting a different substantive, one that is not provided by the world, by an apodicitic phenomena, by a position that is somehow universal and necessary. This adventure is taken further by Hegel in his attempt to establish in a converging Geist a new promised land for substantives.


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