Skip to main content

Process, connection and aerial-subjectivity

The thought of connectedness in the world brings up the issue of who is the agent of a connection. Monadologies offer interesting insights into the issue. Monads are infinite in number - and thus irrepetible as infinity hosts difference - and unique. Still, in Leibniz´s monadology, the harmony is there between monads. Tarde´s has a more definite structure - one that he describes in terms of belief and desire. Such a structure is central for various types of process philosophy: Whitehead´s actual entities with prehensions, objectifications etc or Latour´s entelechias capable of crafting alliances and bringing about networks. The structure is what is repeated everywhere and it is where monadology meets recaptulation: no more than the same, repeated elsewhere. Then, the units are units of connection. It is a world of cables (it is as if the mythical serpent that shapes everything, like the Aboriginal rainbow serpent or the Desane anaconda, was no more than a cable with some internal structure - a black box, to some extent - linking its head to its tail). All processes are triggered by these cables, which ought to have some sort of preestablished properties (and indeed some sort of capacities, of dispositional properties) so that they could fit the bill. Leibniz´ monadology bites the big bullett and spreads the preestablished element across the board. This is where it really looks like metaphysics of the subjectivity: making correlation the ultimate atomic element of everything else. Plus, it makes room for nothing but what depends on those wonder cables. In any case, it makes sense to look for structures that are minimal, that are close to invisibility and, in fact, this is a crucial quest for genuine process philosophy in its committment to high degrees of immanence.

Fabiane Borges, on her forthcoming thesis on post-emancipatory matter, develops interesting ideas around aerials. She considers what it is like to be a satellite in order to establish that transmission and reception could be thoroughly spread. She portrays a life that is oblivious to all sorts of signals that broadcast in a different tuning frequency. Aerials display an openness to those broadcasts - they grab signals. Aerials are not yet TV sets that do something with the received signal. Aerials, she points out, are a different kind of subjectivity - that she labels aerial-subjectivity. They are available, they are at the signal´s disposal. It is perhaps like a subjectivity without decisions, a subjectivity open to invasions and yet not quite a blank slate because although it is not tuned to everything, it has always been tuned to something. The aerial itself is nothing but a reception of the other - and if the other is always other, the aerials have different signal history and maybe we can stretch that to mean that each aerial is unique, not duplicable (like the monads in Leibniz). Surely, a metaphysics of aerial-subjectivity would fare close to the predicament of a metaphysics of subjectivity. And yet, the underlying transcendent structure is at least minimal. It is not correlation itself that is on the road to be made somehow absolute but a certain openness to correlation. Aerials are very different among each other but they are all the reverse of a substance. They remain while the received content changes but that means only that no content remains. No inside but a reflection of the outside (like a mirror but never constrained by its sheer locality). Aerials tuned to other aerials; there is a sense in which they are no more than a position, no more than a place-holder for the signals coming. They are all that needs to be prior to any act of sponsoring that make things be what they are (or rather, receive the signal that they receive). Still, I wonder whether aerials are all we need to exorcise the feeling that there are nothing but the same over and over again (in a recapitulated form)...

Comments

Popular posts from this blog

Hunky, Gunky and Junky - all Funky Metaphysics

Been reading Bohn's recent papers on the possibility of junky worlds (and therefore of hunky worlds as hunky worlds are those that are gunky and junky - quite funky, as I said in the other post). He cites Whitehead (process philosophy tends to go hunky) but also Leibniz in his company - he wouldn't take up gunk as he believed in monads but would accept junky worlds (where everything that exists is a part of something). Bohn quotes Leibniz in On Nature Itself «For, although there are atoms of substance, namely monads, which lack parts, there are no atoms of bulk, that is, atoms of the least possible extension, nor are there any ultimate elements, since a continuum cannot be composed out of points. In just the same way, there is nothing greatest in bulk nor infinite in extension, even if there is always something bigger than anything else, though there is a being greatest in the intensity of its perfection, that is, a being infinite in power.» And New Essays: ... for there is nev...

Memory assemblages

My talk here at Burque last winter I want to start by thanking you all and acknowledging the department of philosophy, the University of New Mexico and this land, as a visitor coming from the south of the border and from the land of many Macroje peoples who themselves live in a way that is constantly informed by memory, immortality and their ancestors, I strive to learn more about the Tiwas, the Sandia peoples and other indigenous communities of the area. I keep finding myself trying to find their marks around – and they seem quite well hidden. For reasons to do with this very talk, I welcome the gesture of directing our thoughts to the land where we are; both as an indication of our situated character and as an archive of the past which carries a proliferation of promises for the future. In this talk, I will try to elaborate and recommend the idea of memory assemblage, a central notion in my current project around specters and addition. I begin by saying that I ...

The underground of concepts: my talk at the Marxism and the Pittsburgh School Conference

In few minutes I'll be presenting this talk in the Marxism and the Pittsburgh School conference in the UCL. I can still change the text but this is how it looks like now. The underground of concepts: McDowell on the productivity of Anschauungen Hilan Bensusan 1. Jean-François Lyotard diagnosed the idea that concepts do the productive work of thinking as a deception. It is not through a dynamics of concepts that conclusions are reached and it is not with the decisive intervention of them that conflicts between alternatives resolved. Lyotard compares the pretense that concepts think with the mystification that capital works. He argues that “what works is not the concept, […] the concept is [like] capital which pretends to work, but which [only] determines the conditions of labour, delimits the outsides and insides, the authorized and the prohibited” (Lyotard, Libidinal Economy, p. 13). This diagnosis, frequently lost in the middle of an ampler argumentation around t...