An interesting feature that became apparent in my debate with Andrès is that often the postulation of a complex epistemology is motivated by the assumption of an underlying simpler metaphysics. This is the case with some anti-realism, including the one that Andrès is keen to spouse, an anti-realism about inconsistencies. His metaphysics is simpler: the world cannot itself harbour inconsistencies (it is somehow free of contrarieties and contradictions, maybe because it is a blobject, or even because there is no metaphysics other than a metaphysics of the us, a transcendental philosophy). On the other hand, if we conceive of a more complex metaphysics – a world composed of, say, doubts, incoherent assemblages, negative facts, negative objects, plots involving different constituting fragments (for instance, different varieties of negation or different logics) – then we can afford a simpler epistemology. I think this trade-off is an interesting one especially to tackle the question myself and Manuel have been considering for a while: how to best revamp the metaphysics underlying Davidson's semantic and epistemology.
Memory Assemblages is out at Bloomsbury This is the book I wrote during most of 22 and 23. It proposes a spectral realism based on the idea that archives are ubiquitous - I call this pan-mnemism. It offers a conception of how memory related deeply with persistent addition of new events, thoughts and circumstances and this addends concoct varying assemblages of what is retained and what brings this archives to the fore. It also rejects the idea that there is an archeology to the archive - or an ontology to hauntology. Even if it boils down merely to postulate traces or forms. I have neglected this blog for a while and I don't expect myself to be very much back to it soon. But I will talk about the book in my youtube channel, in an English language playlist called "On Memory Assemblages" .
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