Been working on a presentation about disjunctivism and the value of knowledge. There I maintain that Pritchard´s way of portraying disjunctivism (which is elegant but associated with the unconvincing thesis that disjunctivism is a form of non-classical internalism) can help making externalists less vulnerable to criticisms such as Zabzebski´s and Kvanvig´s concerning the value of knowledge. The criticism, first addressed to process reliabilism, is that given these accounts of knowledge, true belief is as vaulable as knowledge. I fear that this can be extended to other varieties of externalism and argue that epistemioc disjunctivism about perception (that I see as a variety of externalism, pace Pritchard) can respond to the criticism and even endorse some of Zagzebski´s ideas about intellectual virtues. I´ll post the text for my presentation here soon.
On the other hand, and at the same time, I´m lecturing on Whitehead´s use of Locke´s indirect perception ideas. As readers of this blog know, I´m quite enthused about the avenues Whitehead opens concerning perception. I think they are fruitful and enlightening. But then they rely on indirect perception while disjunctivism is one of the best varieties of a direct perception account. I sometimes feel like the Sunday Church preacher who teaches biology on weekdays.
What do I think about perception?
On the other hand, and at the same time, I´m lecturing on Whitehead´s use of Locke´s indirect perception ideas. As readers of this blog know, I´m quite enthused about the avenues Whitehead opens concerning perception. I think they are fruitful and enlightening. But then they rely on indirect perception while disjunctivism is one of the best varieties of a direct perception account. I sometimes feel like the Sunday Church preacher who teaches biology on weekdays.
What do I think about perception?
http://newbooksinphilosophy.com/2012/12/14/alva-noe-varieties-of-presence-harvard-up-2012/
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