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Truth-mongers, truth-contributors and sponsors

I've been working on a new way to conceive and present my sponsoring account of truth. The account is inspired by the following quote of Latour:

Une phrase ne tient pas parce qu'elle est vraie;
c'est parce qu'elle tient qu'on la dit vraie.
Elle tient à quoi? Mais, justement, à beaucoup de choses. Pourquoi?
Mais parce qu’elle a été accroché à plus solide qu’elle.
Personne ne peut maintenant l’embraler sans défaire le reste à quoi ele tient.
(Latour, Irréductions, 2.4.8)

Been involved in the literature around the work on truth-makers started by the work of Mulligan, Simons and Smith and in the literature around propositions present mostly in Wettstein's work and in the book by Soames, Speaks and King (New thinking about propositions, Oxford Scholarship 2014). Currently, my schema for the new version of the sponsoring account is the following:

Ontology:

Sponsors: these are the basic item in the ontology. They are like agents, capable of bringing something about. Sponsors are fully animated and the sponsoring account is a theory of truth for an animated community and not primarily a conception of truth in representational terms (as a, so to speak, mirror of something out there).

Entente: what sponsors do on their own. (Not always explicitly in terms of agreement between agents) Entente is a sort of a provisional balance between sponsors. There are short and long-lasting ententes.

Truth components:

Truth-contributors: those include truth-makers, truth-bearers and truth-mongers. All of them are sponsors.

Truth-mongers: sponsors that exchange truths and engage in ententes through their capacity to assert and deny propositions.

Propositions: these are the main and primary truth-bearer. Following an intuition of King, I would probably say that truth-mongers endow ententes with the capacity to be true and false. Ententes become then propositions.

Truth-bearers: primarily propositions. They also contribute to truth, for truth-bearers (and truth-mongers) somehow are instrumental in making something true.

Truth-makers: sponsors turned by truth-mongers (and propositions) into agents that sponsor the truth or the falsity of an entente (turned into a proposition).

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