An interesting feature that became apparent in my debate with Andrès is that often the postulation of a complex epistemology is motivated by the assumption of an underlying simpler metaphysics. This is the case with some anti-realism, including the one that Andrès is keen to spouse, an anti-realism about inconsistencies. His metaphysics is simpler: the world cannot itself harbour inconsistencies (it is somehow free of contrarieties and contradictions, maybe because it is a blobject, or even because there is no metaphysics other than a metaphysics of the us, a transcendental philosophy). On the other hand, if we conceive of a more complex metaphysics – a world composed of, say, doubts, incoherent assemblages, negative facts, negative objects, plots involving different constituting fragments (for instance, different varieties of negation or different logics) – then we can afford a simpler epistemology. I think this trade-off is an interesting one especially to tackle the question myself and Manuel have been considering for a while: how to best revamp the metaphysics underlying Davidson's semantic and epistemology.
Been reading Bohn's recent papers on the possibility of junky worlds (and therefore of hunky worlds as hunky worlds are those that are gunky and junky - quite funky, as I said in the other post). He cites Whitehead (process philosophy tends to go hunky) but also Leibniz in his company - he wouldn't take up gunk as he believed in monads but would accept junky worlds (where everything that exists is a part of something). Bohn quotes Leibniz in On Nature Itself «For, although there are atoms of substance, namely monads, which lack parts, there are no atoms of bulk, that is, atoms of the least possible extension, nor are there any ultimate elements, since a continuum cannot be composed out of points. In just the same way, there is nothing greatest in bulk nor infinite in extension, even if there is always something bigger than anything else, though there is a being greatest in the intensity of its perfection, that is, a being infinite in power.» And New Essays: ... for there is nev
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