An interesting feature that became apparent in my debate with Andrès is that often the postulation of a complex epistemology is motivated by the assumption of an underlying simpler metaphysics. This is the case with some anti-realism, including the one that Andrès is keen to spouse, an anti-realism about inconsistencies. His metaphysics is simpler: the world cannot itself harbour inconsistencies (it is somehow free of contrarieties and contradictions, maybe because it is a blobject, or even because there is no metaphysics other than a metaphysics of the us, a transcendental philosophy). On the other hand, if we conceive of a more complex metaphysics – a world composed of, say, doubts, incoherent assemblages, negative facts, negative objects, plots involving different constituting fragments (for instance, different varieties of negation or different logics) – then we can afford a simpler epistemology. I think this trade-off is an interesting one especially to tackle the question myself and Manuel have been considering for a while: how to best revamp the metaphysics underlying Davidson's semantic and epistemology.
This is a month of giving birth: 1. On the first day of the month (my birthday) I sent out my book BUG (Being Up for Grabs) to publisher. A birth-giving moment. 2. On the forth, we started the Journal, called Journal of Questions. It is a Jabèsian and Jarryian endeavor that intends to reflect in many languages about the gaps between thought and translation. It will be available soon. 3. On the 10th, day before yesterday, offspring Devrim A. B. was born. Her name means revolution in Turkish and is a roughly common name. She's very attentive and concentrated - especially on her own fingers that she learned to molest in her youth during her womb months. She was gestated together with BUG. Hope the world enjoys.