Skip to main content

Tension and flat ontology

DeLanda describes the realm of Humean sensory qualities (that ground his neutral monism) as the space of intensities. It is indeed a Deleuzian idea that much is made of differences of intensity. What is intense contrasts with what is extense - for example, the extensive continuum, comparable with the plan d´égalité that Tristan Garcia talks about in his Forme et Objet. The plane is equivalent to the n´importe quoi that he ascribes to anything. The extensive continuum, as the Deleuzian plan d´immanence, the crossoroad of existences in Souriau or, in some sense, Kit Fine´s über-reality (see post below in http://anarchai.blogspot.com.br/2012/05/extensive-continuum-and-space-of.html) are elements for what DeLanda labels flat ontology. Garcia emphasizes the idea of importance saying that valoriser une chose c´est transformer le charactère strictement extensif de toute chose en une intensité (p. 40). We are indeed close to Whitehead: a world of things of all kinds, and a space for equality between all things that is not prior to them but is composed by them. In fact, the extensive depends on the intensive and there is nothing beyond things (or beyond actual entities).

It is interesting to consider this contrast between intension and extension. Tense is a spatio-temporal term, as "to tend" is. Extension has to do with where something stands and the extensive plane is isotropic. Intension introduces an element of anisotropism: there is a direction in the plane, an orientation, an intensity. Modality is intensional, but it is located in an extensive plane. It emerges from the extensional; Hume again: the extensive plane is flat. Tension is the link between two modes of existence that have to be tied together: that of the extensive continuum and that of the actual entity; that of the n´importe quoi and that of the chose; that of a mode of existence and that of the surexistence. Hpwever, to think in terms of tension is to spatialize not only time but everything else. Maybe there is more to flat ontologies than the drive to dispose all in a flat surface.

Comments

Popular posts from this blog

Hunky, Gunky and Junky - all Funky Metaphysics

Been reading Bohn's recent papers on the possibility of junky worlds (and therefore of hunky worlds as hunky worlds are those that are gunky and junky - quite funky, as I said in the other post). He cites Whitehead (process philosophy tends to go hunky) but also Leibniz in his company - he wouldn't take up gunk as he believed in monads but would accept junky worlds (where everything that exists is a part of something). Bohn quotes Leibniz in On Nature Itself «For, although there are atoms of substance, namely monads, which lack parts, there are no atoms of bulk, that is, atoms of the least possible extension, nor are there any ultimate elements, since a continuum cannot be composed out of points. In just the same way, there is nothing greatest in bulk nor infinite in extension, even if there is always something bigger than anything else, though there is a being greatest in the intensity of its perfection, that is, a being infinite in power.» And New Essays: ... for there is nev

Talk on ultrametaphysics

 This is the text of my seminar on ultrametaphysics on Friday here in Albuquerque. An attempt at a history of ultrametaphysics in five chapters Hilan Bensusan I begin with some of the words in the title. First, ‘ultrametaphysics’, then ‘history’ and ‘chapters’. ‘Ultrametaphysics’, which I discovered that in my mouth could sound like ‘ autre metaphysics’, intends to address what comes after metaphysics assuming that metaphysics is an endeavor – or an epoch, or a project, or an activity – that reaches an end, perhaps because it is consolidated, perhaps because it has reached its own limits, perhaps because it is accomplished, perhaps because it is misconceived. In this sense, other names could apply, first of all, ‘meta-metaphysics’ – that alludes to metaphysics coming after physics, the books of Aristotle that came after Physics , or the task that follows the attention to φύσις, or still what can be reached only if the nature of things is considered. ‘Meta-m

Memory assemblages

My talk here at Burque last winter I want to start by thanking you all and acknowledging the department of philosophy, the University of New Mexico and this land, as a visitor coming from the south of the border and from the land of many Macroje peoples who themselves live in a way that is constantly informed by memory, immortality and their ancestors, I strive to learn more about the Tiwas, the Sandia peoples and other indigenous communities of the area. I keep finding myself trying to find their marks around – and they seem quite well hidden. For reasons to do with this very talk, I welcome the gesture of directing our thoughts to the land where we are; both as an indication of our situated character and as an archive of the past which carries a proliferation of promises for the future. In this talk, I will try to elaborate and recommend the idea of memory assemblage, a central notion in my current project around specters and addition. I begin by saying that I