In the last few days I found out about three articles of mine coming out in Brazil. I like the one on queer ontology, which is called "Bodies in clinamina" and start out with speculative dermatology - skin against substance - and moves on to gender allagmatics to close with alliances beyond filiation and the ontological power of contamination. A second is on the ontology of doubts. The last is on a special issue celebrates twelve years of our philosophy and fiction colloquia. They were educational for all of us who were there from the beginning, I believe our philosophy got more and more entrenched within fiction. Not only in terms of writing (although I think this was an important part) but also in terms of topics and how they were thought through. I haven't read the last book of Meillassoux, but I like the title mentioning hors science, to qualify fiction; there is another fiction that is not informed by scientific input or gauged by scientific plausibility. To me, this intertwinement of philosophy and fiction has a lot to do with anarcheology - the creation of versions for philosophical purposes (well, this is the definition I would give now for this purposes). Philosophy very frequently has a kick out of origins - authenticity, archives, ancient texts. This is maybe because philosophers have a complicated relation to history - it fascinates and scares. I guess every philosopher has to find her way around history. It is a personal job that no belonging to a tradition can replace. Anarcheology is one of my ways, and it is a possibility: to let history be recreated, a history of the philosophy that could have been. Not to forget history neither to submit to it, but to increase it.
Been reading Bohn's recent papers on the possibility of junky worlds (and therefore of hunky worlds as hunky worlds are those that are gunky and junky - quite funky, as I said in the other post). He cites Whitehead (process philosophy tends to go hunky) but also Leibniz in his company - he wouldn't take up gunk as he believed in monads but would accept junky worlds (where everything that exists is a part of something). Bohn quotes Leibniz in On Nature Itself «For, although there are atoms of substance, namely monads, which lack parts, there are no atoms of bulk, that is, atoms of the least possible extension, nor are there any ultimate elements, since a continuum cannot be composed out of points. In just the same way, there is nothing greatest in bulk nor infinite in extension, even if there is always something bigger than anything else, though there is a being greatest in the intensity of its perfection, that is, a being infinite in power.» And New Essays: ... for there is nev
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