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Indexicalism in contrast to Hegel and Whitehead (a project)

In the study group around Hegel's Wissenschaft der Logik the topic of the universality of negation and the exercises of the content (as opposed to the fixed and determined categories of Kant) often comes out. Determinate negation and concrete universals provide content with a dynamics that is not determined (in any of its particular movements or arriving points) and yet necessary.

Today it occurred to me a direct contrast between
a) Hegel's general doctrine that conceptual content drives the process of things in a somehow necessary way as negated content gives rise to all things concrete;
b) Whitehead's pan-perceptualism according to which perception in its different forms drives the process of things in a way that is open and yet oriented by the capacity of the perceiver to be lured - a view that spreads agency beyond the limits of concepts and understand contents as responding to something that is genuinely exterior and
c) Indexicalist as the view that the drive of things is neither perception nor conceptual content but rather the deictic friction between what is indoors and what is exterior.

Indexicalism (see here) draws on a Kripke-Perry-Kaplan understanding of indexicals as involved with something exterior to cognition and intention and hence independent of the whereabouts of conceptual contents and of perceived forms - without falling into a myth of the Given and its corresponding problems with the immediate. Indexicalism improves on Whitehead's pan-perceptualism because it postulates exteriority as absolute and therefore as beyond what attracts perception. Both indexicalism and Whitehead can be understood to depend on the way paved by Hegel in his attempt to take (conceptual) content as a dynamical force that drives things beyond the subject's pale.


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