Skip to main content

A conjecture on deferralist indexicalism

Imagine we do take propositions to be formed by (essential) indexicals. That is, sentences could have indexicals and non-indexicals (substantive) but:

i. only indexicals directly refer - ouch, hard thing to state, but I'm conjecturing that substantive refer only through indexical definitions (the translation of a de dicto expression into a de re one is a step towards providing indexical definitions but cannot be the whole translation for, as Perry wrote (in The problem of the essential indexical, henceforth PEI): "De re propositions remain non- indexical. Propositions individuated in part by objects remain as insensitive to what is essential in locating beliefs as those individuated wholly by concepts." A complete translation of substantives to indexical descriptions would look like this: a proper name is replaced a rule for pointing (Hegel becomes "that philosopher who believed things abbreviate concepts" and then "philosopher" becomes "those that do that and that" etc.), substantives are replaced by a de re description at first, bearing in mind with Perry that "de dicto belief, already demoted from its central place in the philosophy of belief, might be seen as merely an illusion, engendered by the implicit nature of much indexicality. only indexicals compose propositions" (PEI), and then by indexical descriptions of the de re relations ("hot" becomes something like "hotter than average", "snow" becomes something like "that thing that appears in the surface in cold times" and "blue" becomes something like "the color of this and that").

11. only indexicals are in the propositions. "I am here now" would mean the proposition (CONTEXT, I, here, now). Propositions are then of the form {CONTEXT, Indexical(1), ..., Indexical(n)}. In the formula of Kaplan (in Demonstratives): we would have Character: Contexts → Contents and Content: Circumstances → Extensions . Then contents (extensions) are indexicals and characters are defined as propositions. A character results from indexical definitions of non-indexical expressions. CONTEXT here would be something to be pointed at, a demonstration and not a definite description.

Deferralism would then vindicated because propositions are relativized to contexts and there would be no non-indexical item. Propositions are not thoughts but rather how things are in a situation. Further, when we move from contexts of enunciation to contexts of evaluation, the proposition would no longer be the same.

Does that make any sense?

Comments

Popular posts from this blog

Giving Birth

This is a month of giving birth: 1. On the first day of the month (my birthday) I sent out my book BUG (Being Up for Grabs) to publisher. A birth-giving moment. 2. On the forth, we started the Journal, called Journal of Questions. It is a Jabèsian and Jarryian endeavor that intends to reflect in many languages about the gaps between thought and translation. It will be available soon. 3. On the 10th, day before yesterday, offspring Devrim A. B. was born. Her name means revolution in Turkish and is a roughly common name. She's very attentive and concentrated - especially on her own fingers that she learned to molest in her youth during her womb months. She was gestated together with BUG. Hope the world enjoys.

My responses to (some) talks in the Book Symposium

Indexicalism is out: l https://edinburghuniversitypress.com/book-indexicalism.html   The book symposium took place two weeks ago with talks by Sofya Gevorkyan/Carlos Segovia, Paul Livingston, Gerson Brea, Steven Shaviro, Chris RayAlexander, Janina Moninska, Germán Prosperi, Gabriela Lafetá, Andrea Vidal, Elzahrã Osman, Graham Harman, Charles Johns, Jon Cogburn, Otavio Maciel, Aha Else, JP Caron, Michel Weber and John Bova. My very preliminary response to some of their talks about the book follows. (Texts will appear in a special issue of Cosmos & History soon). RESPONSES : ON SAYING PARADOXICAL THINGS Hilan Bensusan First of all, I want to thank everyone for their contributions. You all created a network of discussions that made the book worth publishing. Thanks. Response to Shaviro: To engage in a general account of how things are is to risk paradox. Totality, with its different figures including the impersonal one that enables a symmetrical view from nowhere

Hunky, Gunky and Junky - all Funky Metaphysics

Been reading Bohn's recent papers on the possibility of junky worlds (and therefore of hunky worlds as hunky worlds are those that are gunky and junky - quite funky, as I said in the other post). He cites Whitehead (process philosophy tends to go hunky) but also Leibniz in his company - he wouldn't take up gunk as he believed in monads but would accept junky worlds (where everything that exists is a part of something). Bohn quotes Leibniz in On Nature Itself «For, although there are atoms of substance, namely monads, which lack parts, there are no atoms of bulk, that is, atoms of the least possible extension, nor are there any ultimate elements, since a continuum cannot be composed out of points. In just the same way, there is nothing greatest in bulk nor infinite in extension, even if there is always something bigger than anything else, though there is a being greatest in the intensity of its perfection, that is, a being infinite in power.» And New Essays: ... for there is ne