Skip to main content

On "être est entente"

Been thinking a bit about this idea that came to me lecturing on Whitehead last year: to be is to be part of a current agreement ("être est entente"- call it "EEE"). Sponsoring something is a way to make something exist as the agreement has to be enough to make something come into being (or bring something about, or "instaurer"). I hope to soon spell out details of a sponsoring account of truth, that is part of the broader EEE thesis, in terms of contributors as articulators of truth-makers. I also hope to soon articulate EEE in terms of the structure of a proposition, and adopt a Whiteheadian take on it by considering the subject and the supraject (and how they have meet up in some sort of copula). EEE is an ontological thesis that fleshes out the idea that to exist is more like being part of a crowd - where nothing subsists on its own - than to have a property of existence - that could be reached by being for instance the most perfect - or to have be a predicate of position - or an indexical. (To be sure, the Lewisian indexical view can be put together with the EEE conception that to exist is to co-exist: a possible world could be like a crowd, to be in a possible world is to be with a collection of other denizens of the world, to exist in the actual world is to be with a collection of other denizens of *this particular* world.) In any case, EEE holds that existence is somehow related to a critical mass, in the sense that coming to existence is never made justice by (at least ontological) monism. For what does it mean to become existent if there is nothing else that exists?

But in the last few days I was somehow focused on the politics of EEE. I've been teaching a small course on Amazonian politics (and its relation to ontology) based on remarks made by anthropologists Pierre Clastres and Philippe Descola and Yanomami shaman Davi Kopenawa. The idea of a society against the state and the idea of aanimist shamanism, where non-humans are endowed with interiority, point towards the idea that nothing can come to social existence (including our ecological relations with the non-human) without negotiation. It is as if the political power - and Modern naturalism - comes to displace a diplomatic generalized endeavor where everything has to be negotiated in a case-by-case basis. Hence, the war chief has to negotiate peace of war within the limits of his/her community as there is no political power that makes agreement come without saying. There is no state mechanism to make people fight or stop fighting. Similarly, the shaman has to negotiate with animals what is about to happen in the upcoming hunt. Game is not simply at our mercy but rather its availability results from the capacity to craft alliances. This diplomatic power requires presence - this is why the shaman's knowledge is like a technique that cannot be trusted to a treatise or a report for it is, more than knowledge about how things are, something like a know-how, a craft, a capacity to deal with alliances and to negotiate. Political power crafts its own alliances and ententes, but case-by-case negotiation is circumvented by a shortcut that makes the sovereign force prevail - a society with state. Political power makes the non-human out of reach for negotiation; apart from technology, which is not very thought through, the Moderns have no tools to negotiate beyond their human boundaries. Negotiation got limited to the devices of political power (and the devices of capital).

What is still unclear is exactly how this political dimension of EEE fits in. Maybe I want to say that negotiations are always present - even covered up by a political state (or by the capital, or by technology that makes the non-human somehow in touch with us). Maybe rather that we are somehow ontologically alienated of the entente character of being by whatever makes some agreements invisible or impossible. In any case, if politics is just ontology of the whos - or the agents - than it is not more normative than politics. If it is so, I can just preach: craft alliances, let things be.

Comments

Popular posts from this blog

Hunky, Gunky and Junky - all Funky Metaphysics

Been reading Bohn's recent papers on the possibility of junky worlds (and therefore of hunky worlds as hunky worlds are those that are gunky and junky - quite funky, as I said in the other post). He cites Whitehead (process philosophy tends to go hunky) but also Leibniz in his company - he wouldn't take up gunk as he believed in monads but would accept junky worlds (where everything that exists is a part of something). Bohn quotes Leibniz in On Nature Itself «For, although there are atoms of substance, namely monads, which lack parts, there are no atoms of bulk, that is, atoms of the least possible extension, nor are there any ultimate elements, since a continuum cannot be composed out of points. In just the same way, there is nothing greatest in bulk nor infinite in extension, even if there is always something bigger than anything else, though there is a being greatest in the intensity of its perfection, that is, a being infinite in power.» And New Essays: ... for there is nev

Talk on ultrametaphysics

 This is the text of my seminar on ultrametaphysics on Friday here in Albuquerque. An attempt at a history of ultrametaphysics in five chapters Hilan Bensusan I begin with some of the words in the title. First, ‘ultrametaphysics’, then ‘history’ and ‘chapters’. ‘Ultrametaphysics’, which I discovered that in my mouth could sound like ‘ autre metaphysics’, intends to address what comes after metaphysics assuming that metaphysics is an endeavor – or an epoch, or a project, or an activity – that reaches an end, perhaps because it is consolidated, perhaps because it has reached its own limits, perhaps because it is accomplished, perhaps because it is misconceived. In this sense, other names could apply, first of all, ‘meta-metaphysics’ – that alludes to metaphysics coming after physics, the books of Aristotle that came after Physics , or the task that follows the attention to φύσις, or still what can be reached only if the nature of things is considered. ‘Meta-m

Memory assemblages

My talk here at Burque last winter I want to start by thanking you all and acknowledging the department of philosophy, the University of New Mexico and this land, as a visitor coming from the south of the border and from the land of many Macroje peoples who themselves live in a way that is constantly informed by memory, immortality and their ancestors, I strive to learn more about the Tiwas, the Sandia peoples and other indigenous communities of the area. I keep finding myself trying to find their marks around – and they seem quite well hidden. For reasons to do with this very talk, I welcome the gesture of directing our thoughts to the land where we are; both as an indication of our situated character and as an archive of the past which carries a proliferation of promises for the future. In this talk, I will try to elaborate and recommend the idea of memory assemblage, a central notion in my current project around specters and addition. I begin by saying that I