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Perception, co-existence and transcendental empiricism

Co-existence (and genuinely meeting something) has to do with experience: the impact of what we meet can only be accesses in a posteriori manner. If to be exist is to co-exist, to exist is to be in the plan of experience (to exist is like, as I said in one of my posts yesterday, being in a crowd). This plan of experience is where something encounters something else and whatever is encountered is a pole in the subject-superject structure of a proposition, according to Whitehead, and therefore an actual entity. Whitehead takes perception to be the metaphysically cement of the world - it should replace substance. As a consequence, as he puts it, the genetic story about an actual entity precedes the morphological story - actual entities are detected by perception and then located in the organization of space. The genetic story - where prehensions and their capacity to bring in novelty takes place - is where experience takes place; it is a story of perceptions of all kinds and what acts as their object. Experience precedes placing in space, it is the condition for an actual entity to take place as nothing can exist while being indifferent to all perceptions (there is no vacuous actuality).

I was thinking that this was indeed Deleuze's inspiration for his transcendental empiricism. He puts in different terms this precedence of the genetic. It is his (Whiteheadian) way to break with a metaphysics of substance that had made Locke gone astray and not take seriously, again according to Whitehead, his account of perception. Genetic is immanent - morphology is the emerging transcendence that shapes, through experience, further experience.

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